HUMAN BEINGS MATURE; THEY DO
NOT DEVELOP FROM "POTENTIAL HUMAN BEINGS." Some people claim that what
is conceived by human parents, the "conceptus," is not immediately
human, but becomes human after some length of time, variously determined by
different people. Some of these speak of the early conceptus as a
"potential" human being. They say that the conceptus, prior to some
stage of its development, is not a human being, but that it is in the process
of becoming one. The expression
"potentially human" is sometimes applied to the pair of gametes
before conception, since they are material from which the body of the new
organism is formed. However, their potentiality is not sufficient to explain
the new individual which results from their fusion. The new individual is
qualitatively more than the sum of its material components. It is a
"whole" which is organized by its own life-principle, which now
vitalizes that matter. The gametes are highly specialized cells, but they are
not organisms. The sperm, for example, is quantatively individualized and
motile, but it has no inherent tendency to serve itself; it is ordained solely
to fusion with the ovum. Its potentiality is actualized in doing "its
material part" in the production of the zygote. The two gametes are the means
whereby sexual reproduction accomplishes its unique purpose, that of producing
an offspring which is genetically enriched with the inheritable characteristics
of two parents instead of one, thereby enriching the species with variety. A
gamete, of itself, can never result in a human being, whereas a zygote either
is a human being or, for those who speak of it as a "potential" human
being, is in the process of becoming a human being. THE QUESTION, THEN, IS
WHETHER THE ZYGOTE IS AN END IN ITSELF OR WHETHER IT IS, LIKE THE GAMETES, A
MEANS TO SOMETHING ELSE SPECIFICALLY DIFFERENT FROM ITSELF? If the zygote is only a
"potential" human being, then it is not an actual human being. But if
it is not actually human, what kind of thing is it? Is the so-called
"potential human being" an organism and, if so, of what biological
species? Biologists use the word "species" to classify those
organisms which, when mature, interbreed in their natural environment. Maturity
is not required for membership in a species, since the species status of an
organism is determined by heredity in the zygote stage of the organism, the
most immature stage of its existence. DEFINITION: Conception is the
uniting of the two reproductive cells, called "gametes," to form the
one-cell stage of the conceptus, called "zygote," the first stage of
the offspring's existence. It is an instantaneous event, taking place at the
moment when the gametes lose their specific identity and when the offspring
begins to exist. DEFINITION: An organism is a
living, natural, individual being, whose parts are coordinated among themselves
and subordinated to the independent and self serving functions of the whole. What does
"potential" human being mean when applied to the conceptus? Does it
deny that the conceptus is an organism, as well as deny that it is human? Those
who justify abortion as the killing of something less than a human being, do
not use "potential" to signify a mere lack of maturity. Even after
birth, a human person is still not physically, psychologically or legally
mature. Possibly their position is based on a faulty concept of "human
person." By common usage, every human being, even an immature one, is a
person. Occasionally someone uses the word "person" to express a
degree of maturity, whether of character or of social relationships, but there
is no justification for such usage, SINCE THERE ARE NO DEGREES OF BEING A
PERSON. "Personality," of course, is another thing and should not be
confused with "person."
Those who consider the
conceptus to be only a "potential organism" might be assuming that
the conceptus in only a blob of cells or a part of its mother. But, as seen in
Section 2, even at the zygote stage it is an actual organism in its own right,
therefore neither a "potential" organism nor a part of any other
organism. Biologists agree that, even
from the zygote stage, the conceptus behaves as an independent, though
immature, organism, developing itself from within, needing the mother, now,
only by way of environment. They make no distinction among zygotes of any
species, turnip or man, when they state that the one-cell stage is already a
new organism, the offspring of its two parents, and is of the same species as they
are. Philosophers come to the same conclusion by reasoning from the natural
purpose of reproduction: to bring into existence new individuals of the same
species as the parents. To this the biologists add their observation that the
zygote, because it is an essentially independent organism, is already the
offspring intended by that natural process of reproduction. To the philosopher and
biologist, the period of gestation and consequent birth add nothing specific to
the offspring, maturity being a difference of degree, not of kind. Modern
scientists find no valid reason for applying the term "potential
human" to the conceptus, if the expression is used to imply that the
conceptus is not a human being. With the help of the geneticist, they find the
conceptus, at all stages of its existence, to be the very same organism which
the parents conceived and which, after birth, continues to mature until
adulthood. AFTER HAVING CREATED THE
"POTENTIAL HUMAN BEING" ROE V. WADE WOULD NOT VENTURE TO TELL US WHEN
THEY THOUGHT THE POTENTIALITY BECOMES ACTUALIZED. Those who attribute only
"potential humanity" to the conceptus are hard pressed to specify the
point in time or stage of development at which the potentiality is finally
actualized and the human being begins to exist. A number of such points have
been offered: quickening, the local movements of the fetus felt by the mother;
viability, the ability of the fetus to live in an extra-uterine environment;
the first breathing of air; birth and, for some few, various points of
development after birth.
All such landmarks might be
suitable criteria for legally establishing the existence of the conceptus, but
they have no specifying significance in the biological and philosophical
sciences. Whether a human being gets his oxygen indirectly, by diffusion in the
placenta, or directly, in the lungs, is of little consequence to the biologist
who is accustomed to observing the metamorphosis of the tadpole from its marine
environment to the considerably
different structures needed for its frog-life on land. Quickening was sometimes
claimed to be evidence for the beginning of human life, in confusion with its
use as a legal landmark, despite the fact that identical motions were known to
take place in pregnant sheep, horses, etc. In the case of humans, obviously,
the human nature of personhood must have been taken for granted and the
quickening was used only as evidence for the fact that the human individual, as
yet unborn, was "alive and kicking." Viability is also a
non-specifying quality of the conceptus, despite its medical and legal
significance. There is no evidence to indicate that the conceptus is not
numerically and specifically the same organism, before and after viability. In
fact, with modern advances in neo-natal technology, the precise time of
viability is highly relative. The "test-tube baby," in the Petrie
dish before implantation into a uterus, is obviously living apart from its
mother. To put it simply, there is no
demonstrable point after conception, including the implantation of the embryo
in the uterine wall, the development of the placenta, or any structural or
functional change in the conceptus itself, which warrants the claim that it is
the point at which the conceptus becomes a human being. Even the absence of the
more evidently human structures, such as facial and digital characteristics in
the early conceptus, is not a problem to the biologist who is accustomed to
seeing one and the same organism, in one stage of its development, to be a
commonplace, crawling caterpillar and, in another stage, a beautiful, flying
moth. Those who use the expression
"potential human being" might examine whether they are confusing
"potential" with "immature" or are attributing to the
zygote the organism-deficient status of the gametes. Similar errors have been
seen, for example, in those who identify non-viability of a fetus with the
denial of its autonomy as an independent organism. SOME DIFFICULTIES TO PONDER:
There are several highly specialized difficulties which must be indicated in this
consideration of human conception.
Historically, Aristotle's
theory of successive animation should be mentioned. His reasoning: "Matter
should be suitably predisposed before it can become vitalized by any specific
principle of life." Detecting in man the threefold characteristics of
vegetative, animal and intellective life, Aristotle taught that the human
individual develops through three successive stages, the preceding stage
preparing the matter for the next higher form of life. In light of modern biology,
it need no longer be thought that these stages occupy time intervals after
conception, but that the first two, vegetal and animal, are completed in the
gametes and that the final stage begins with their complete fusion, at
conception. The theory of identical
twins, based on the supposed separation of what is said to be a single
conceptus in one of its early cleavages, giving rise to two separate
individuals, need not be construed as contradictory to the position that human
life begins at conception. There is not yet sufficient knowledge available for
any sound application of this phenomenon to human conception. Present
information comes predominantly from studies on organisms far less complex than
man. It would be interesting to speculate whether, in the case of humans,
identical twins are no less fraternal than any other twins, contrary to what is
generally supposed. With several million sperms involved, it is not impossible
that two ova which are considerably alike genetically might be fertilized by
two sperms of almost identical genetic make up. The more recently proposed
converse of identical twinning, the case of two highly immature organisms
becoming one, is even more obscure. It would not be unscientific
to hold that the above phenomena, should they be true, are exceptions to the
normal process of the human beginning. To fully understand them, the biologist
would need the help of the philosopher. In the case of identical twins, the
philosopher would hold that a human conceptus, in an early cleavage, could die
and its matter remain sufficiently organized in both parts of the cleavage to
be revitalized by two other principles of life, each part being more suitably
organized as the matter of an individual than the whole had been immediately
prior to the moment of cleavage.
On a smaller scale, the
natural process of cell division is explained by showing that a certain
increase of volume prompts a cell to divide. It must do so to survive, since
the cell membrane through which the cell contents are served, no longer has
sufficient surface area. (Volume increases by the 3rd power, whereas the
surface increases only by the 2nd power.) Difficulties of this kind,
however significant in themselves, should not be invoked by those who favor
abortion, because abortions are generally sought and procured long after the
conceptus has passed through the stages wherein such phenomena are possible. BECAUSE OF THE HISTORICAL
SIGNIFICANCE OF ARISTOTLE'S THEORY OF HUMAN REPRODUCTION, A BRIEF EXAMINATION
OF HIS POSITION IS PRESENTED HERE: In his philosophical demonstration, every
natural body is composed of an active and a passive principle. The passive
constitutive principle, called "prime matter," is actualized in its
concrete state of existence by the active principle which he called the
"substantial form" of the body. The active characteristics of
any natural body, its various energies and resulting activity, are attributed
to the body's substantial form. The substantial form of any organism has a
special name. It is called the "soul" (psyche, Gk.) of that organism. The souls of organisms which
manifest activity only with regard to material objects (plants, and animals
inferior to man) exist only as long as the organism exists. The soul of such an
organism has no independent existence and, for practical purposes, could be
said to be furnished by the reproductive action of the parents. The parents do
not supply the soul, however, since each has only one of its own, but rather
occasion the circumstances whereby suitably predisposed matter, by a natural
process, becomes the new individual. This would be analogues to
the formation of a molecule from the matter of previously disposed atoms, as
required by the conditions of chemical change. The new substantial form which
organizes the matter of sodium and chlorine in the sodium chloride molecule
could not have been possessed by either of the atoms. In fact, it cannot exist
except in the molecule of sodium chloride, since this specific organization of
matter is what makes the molecule to be what it is. In the case of asexual
reproduction of one-celled organisms, it is easy to assume that the life of the
dividing cell is continuous with the lives of the two new cells. In the general
sense that "Life comes only from life." there is a continuity of
life, which seems to validate the assumption. But, since there are two
individuals after division, at least one of them, if not both, must possess a
new life and, therefore, a new active principle of its organized individuality.
The mysterious origin of the soul of the new organism is to be attributed to
the potential which Nature's Author has implanted in living matter, enabling
simple organisms to reproduce new individuals of their own kind. The production
of chemical compounds is no less mysterious under this aspect. Yet, new
molecules and new organisms do come into being. In sexual reproduction, the
gametes, by analogy, fill the role of ions which, when chemically combined,
lose their specific identities in favor of the compound's identity. The new
organizing principle, or substantial form, except in the case of human
reproduction, takes its rise proximately in the potency of the living matter of
the two gametes and, more remotely, but primarily, in the living matter of the
parents who produced the gametes. THE VITALIZATION OF MATTER BY
A HUMAN SOUL PRESENTS A SPECIAL PROBLEM, NOT EXPERIENCED IN CHEMISTRY OR IN THE
BIOLOGY OF ORGANISMS INFERIOR TO MAN. In the case of human reproduction two
factors are demanded: adequately predisposed matter and a human soul directed
to organize and vitalize that matter as its principle of life. A human soul,
the substantial form of a human being, is a non-material substance, which
cannot be attributed to the potency of living matter as its origin. To examine this briefly:
Through his activity, the human being manifests a non-material principle of
life. By a process of intellectual abstraction he can know non-material
objects, such abstract realities as beauty and truth, and can be motivated in
his free choice by ends which are non-material, such as honesty and patriotism.
Some activity, furthermore, shows the principle of a human person's life to be
substantial, that is, capable of existence independent of the body. An example
of this is intellective reflection, which requires of the body only the initial
presentation of something to think about. Because it is a non-material
substance, the soul of the human being cannot be attributed to the potency of
matter. It has to be created, directly, by God. Unlike other substantial forms,
a human soul, equipped with non-material faculties of intellect and free will,
is unique to each human individual. It is the foundation of his or her personal
individuality and, because of its non-material makeup, is the reason for his or
her continuation in existence as a person throughout eternity. Getting back to human
reproduction, there arises a question concerning the time at which a human soul
uniquely vitalizes the predisposed matter furnished by the parents. Is it
immediately upon the fusion of the two gametes, so that the zygote is at once
the new human individual? Or is some further development of that matter needed
before it is sufficiently capable of being vitalized by the human soul? IN THE OPINION OF ARISTOTLE,
the fusion of the two parental gametes does not immediately produce a human
being, the resulting matter not yet having been sufficiently predisposed to
become vitalized by a human soul. He postulated a delay of forty days for males
and eighty days for females to accomplish the necessary predisposition of the
matter. It is likely that his choice of time was based upon the need that each
individual be of a certain gender. By gross observation of spontaneously
aborted fetuses he could detect the presence of external genitalia at those
times. In our day, gender can be known by the cytologist even at the zygote
stage, through the examination of chromosome structure. In terms of modern
embryology there is no evidence to uphold Aristotle's selection of these two
dates, nor is there any scientific evidence which points to any other probable
date, after conception, when hominization should occur. Aristotle believed that the
adequate predisposition of matter to be vitalized by a human soul required that
it had to have had a vegetative existence first, and then an animal existence.
In practice, this would mean that the matter which is the passive constitutive
principle of any human body had at one time been vitalized by a vegetative
soul. Then, under the influence of that vegetative soul, the vegetable became
sufficiently developed, in its proper environment, so that its matter could now
become vitalized by an animal soul. The animal, in turn, developed sufficiently
so that its matter became suitable for being vitalized by a human soul. It is
difficult to see why this would not necessitate three individual organisms,
rather than one-and-the-same individual from conception through hominization. Aristotle's reason for the
triple successive animations seems to be an attempt to explain the three-fold
capability of man: his vegetative, sentient and human characteristics. By
analogy, his reasoning may be similar to that of the organic evolutionist who
sees in the development of the human embryo a recapitulation of phylogenic
history. It should be noted that there
are possible explanations for human embryonic development, other than that of
traditional evolutionary theory. It might well be that the human body passes
through stages at which more-primitive organisms stopped. This would not indicate
that man is a descendent of those lesser organisms, but that, in the economy of
nature, the same "blueprint" might serve for the development of
homologus "sub-structures" of the more complex organisms. Inheritance
of such "sub-structures" would not be required in the theory of
creationism; they would be part of the equipment given the individuals of a
species at creation. With due deference to the
philosophical principle of Aristotle (that matter must be suitably predisposed
before being "informed" by any given substantial form) exception may
be taken to his application in reference to human reproduction. Although he is
frequently called the Father of Biology, it is no discredit to him to recall
that he lived some five hundred years before Christ and was lacking the
instrumentation and consequent knowledge which present day embryologists enjoy. To vindicate Aristotle's
philosophical principle, a modern biologist can show that a human being does
indeed result from the fusion of highly predisposed material, the ovum and
spermatozoon of two human parents. He can demonstrate the fact that the ovum is
greatly vegetative in structure and that the sperm is apparently sentient. But
he would be at a loss to see any need for a time delay, after conception, for
any further development of that highly specialized matter before it should be
vitalized by a human soul.
In the spirit of Aristotle's
principle the biologist could point to the fact that, although the gametes are
in some sense living matter, they never had been complete organisms, since they
have no other destiny than to become matter for the new individual. But the
matter which they provide, however incomplete it is in itself, is already
sufficiently predisposed with vegetative and sentient characteristics to be
ready for vitalization by a human soul, at the moment of conception. REVIEW AND ADDITIONAL In Roe v. Wade, without
definition and without precedent, the Court introduces such terms as
"potential life" and "potential human life" and
"potentiality of human life." They are found in [410 US 158] "As we have
intimated above, it is reasonable and appropriate for a State to decide that at
some point in time another interest, that of health of the mother or that of
POTENTIAL HUMAN LIFE, becomes significantly involved." [410 US 162] "Such an action, however, would appear to be one to
vindicate the parents' interest and is thus consistent with the view that the
fetus, at most, represents only the POTENTIALITY OF LIFE." ibid. "...the State.....has still another important and legitimate
interest in protecting the POTENTIALITY OF HUMAN LIFE." [410 US 163] "With respect to the States' important and legitimate
interest in POTENTIAL LIFE, the compelling point is at viability." It is conceivable that the expression
"potentiality of human life" could be synonymous with "the
possibility that a human being is present." But the totality of the
expressions quoted above, when seen in their context, strongly suggests that
the Court is speaking about something which is not human, yet has the
capability of becoming human at some later time. That
"something" is the offspring of human parentage in early stages of
its existence. We must respectfully reject the validity of this concept
of the Court. Simply put, there is no counterpart in the world of nature
to match that concept. In fact, it is a contradiction of terms. In our everyday speech, the
word "life" is used in many senses, one of them the primary meaning,
the others only by way of analogy. In its primary sense, life is had only by
organisms. You might ask yourself "Is my thumb alive, or is it I who am
alive?" To speak of the thumb as being alive, you do not mean that it is
alive in the same sense that you are alive. In a multi-cellular organism the
cells do not have a life of their own. It is the organism's life which they
share. If this were not so, the organism would not be an individual but rather
a colony of individuals. The old axiom in Biology,
"Life comes only from life." needs to be understood in the sense that
there are analogous forms of life, some of which are necessary for bringing
about the others. In no instance, however, does any member of one form become a
member of the other. It does not have the potentiality to do so. The
reproductive cells of human beings, for example, do not have the capability of
becoming human beings. Nor do any other cells of a human being. Cells, whether
within a living human's body or removed and exposed to tissue culture, never
turn into human beings. Although they might sometimes be called "human
cells" they are not the possessors of human life. In some sense they may
be necessary for human life and, in some sense, participate in human life, but
only the person whose cells they are has the human life. ANYTHING SHORT OF PRECISE
ACCURACY IN THE USE OF WORDS MAY CONFUSE THOSE INVOLVED IN A DISCUSSION. Not
only the words "life" and "potential," but even the word
"human," may easily be misused. After a man's death we might speak of
"his" body, or speak of the body as "a human body."
Strictly speaking, a body can be human only while it is being vitalized by a
human soul, that is, during a person's lifetime. After death, it is the disorganized
residue of what had been a human body. As for its being his body, if it were
indeed his body, he would still be a living person and not one who had died.
Keeping this in mind, let us examine the claim for "potential human
life." As an extreme example, is
there "potential life" in the food you eat? Does it have the
capability of becoming alive? After digestion and assimilation, the food is no
longer existing as anything in its own right, therefore it could not be the
possessor of life. The only living thing in this example is the eater of the
food. The case of the two reproductive cells (gametes) is not much different.
If they are said to be alive, before fusion, it is no longer their life which
exists after fusion. That which is present now is the life of the new organism.
The life of the cells is only analogous with the life of the organism. The
cells did not have the potential to become the kind of thing which the organism
is, even though they were instrumental in the process. The case in point, is whether
the offspring of human parents, at any stage of its existence, could be only a
"potential human being".
POTENTIALITIES (CAPABILITIES)
ARE LIMITED TO THE KIND OF THING TO WHICH THEY BELONG. A turnip could never
have the capability of reasoning, simply because its parents are never able to
bestow such an ability upon their offspring. And they can't bestow it, because
they don't possess it themselves. The only abilities possessed by turnips is to
do turnip-things. The capability to perform uniquely human actions, such as reasoning,
whether at this moment, or only years from now, demands a human subject as its
possessor. If the offspring of human parentage, at any time, even in the
zygote-stage, possesses the "potentiality to act as a human being,"
he or she is already a human being. Nothing else could possess that capability.
As for the "potentiality to be a human" it would be a contradiction
of terms, since the potential and the actual cannot exist simultaneously in
anything.